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The Positive and Negative
Framing of Affirmative Action:
A Group Dominance Perspective
Hillary Haley
Jim Sidanius
University of California, Los Angeles
Using a sample of 328 White, Latino, and Black Los Angeles
County adults, the authors examined the tendency to employ
various affirmative action “frames” (e.g., affirmative action
as a “tie-breaking” device or as a quota-based policy). All three
groups agreed about which frames cast affirmative action in a
positive light and which cast it in a negative light. Although
minorities had a tendency to frame affirmative action in terms
that mostpeoplefind morallyacceptable, Whites had a tendency
to frame affirmative action in terms most people find unaccept-
able. In addition, compared to minorities, Whites were less sup-
portive of affirmative action regardless of how it was framed.
LISRELmodelingalsowasemployedtotesttwocompetingmod-
elsregardingpredictorsofthetendencytouseframesthatoneper-
sonallyfinds toberelativelynegativeversuspositive.Consistent
with the expectations of social dominance theory and a moti-
vated cognition perspective, the authors found that social domi-
nanceorientation(SDO)hadsignificantnetdirectandindirect
effects on one’s framing of affirmative action.
Keywords: affirmative action; framing effects; motivated reasoning;
social dominance theory; social dominance orientation
Preciselywhatdopeoplemeanwhentheyusetheterm
“affirmative action”? Are people typically referring to
outreach and training programs for disadvantaged
groups, to admissions and hiring policies that simply
takeapplicants’groupmembershipsintoconsideration,
or to pure quota-based initiatives? Just as there are a
great manyprograms andpolicies designed totakeaffir-
mative action on behalf of different groups, there are
also many different ways that people can interpret the
termwhenreflectingon,andmakingjudgmentsandde-
cisionsabout,thingshavingtodowithaffirmativeaction
ingeneral.Becausepeople’sinterpretationsinturntend
to reinforce their preexisting attitudes, and serve as fil-
ters for new, incoming information (e.g., see Fazio,
1990),itisessential,instudyingaffirmativeaction,toun-
derstand exactly what people’s interpretations are and
where they come from.
Much research in social and political psychology has
explored the questions of whether and why people sup-
portaffirmativeactionasageneralpracticeandwhether
and why they support specific group-targeted policies in
particular. Such research has consistently shown that
support varies asa functionof respondents’ political ori-
entation (with liberals being more supportive than con-
servatives; e.g., Aberson & Haag, 2003; Sidanius, Pratto,
& Bobo, 1996), as a function of respondents’ racial/
ethnic group (with minorities being more supportive
than Whites; e.g., Kinder & Sanders, 1996; Kluegel &
Smith, 1986), and as a function of the framing and/or
details of the policy under consideration (e.g., Bell,
Harrison, & McLaughlin, 2000; Fine, 1992; Kinder &
Sanders,1990).Notably,though,farlessresearchhasex-
aminedhowpeopleactivelyconstrue,orframe,theterm
“affirmative action” themselves; that is, although we
know a lot about people’s responses to scripted versions
ofaffirmativeactioncases,weknowrelativelylittleabout
why people, when thinking about affirmative action on
their own, tend to frame it in particular ways.
The research presented in this article aims to repli-
cate past work on affirmative action preferences and to
meaningfully build on that past work by examining how
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ways.
Effects of Issue Framing
on Affirmative Action Attitudes
Past research has repeatedly shown that the popular-
ityofaffirmativeactionprogramscanradicallyriseorde-
cline depending on how the term “affirmative action” is
framed and/or what specific policy is under consider-
ation (e.g.,Bell et al.,2000; Bobo & Kleugel, 1993; Bobo
& Smith, 1994; Fine, 1992; Kinder & Sanders, 1990;
Kravitz, 1995; Schuman, Steeh, Bobo, & Krysan, 1997;
Sniderman & Carmines, 1997; Summers, 1995). For ex-
ample,Boboandcolleagues(e.g.,Bobo&Kleugel,1993;
Bobo & Smith, 1994) have shown that people are more
supportiveof“opportunity-enhancing”formsofaffirma-
tive action than of “outcome-directed” forms. Similarly,
Sniderman and Carmines (1997) found that White
Americans were more partial to affirmative action when
it was framed in terms of making extra efforts to achieve
equal treatment of groups rather than in terms of giv-
ing preferential treatment to certain groups (see also
Summers, 1995). Furthermore, Kravitz and Klineberg
(2000) found that both Whites and Blacks were more
supportive of “typical” affirmative action policies when
theybelievedthattypicalmeanttheabsenceofpreferen-
tial treatment. Unsurprisingly, it also has been shown
that people are rather unsupportive of quota-based pro-
grams and of programs stipulating clear-cut racial pref-
erences (e.g., Schuman et al., 1997).
Similarly, support for affirmative action has been
showntodependontherealorsupposedcharacteristics
of potential recipients and related contextual factors.
For example, in a recent experimental study, Quinn,
Ross, and Esses (2001) found that college students’ en-
dorsement of affirmative action programs varied de-
pendingonwhetherthestudentsbelieved(a)thatrecip-
ient groups were responsible for their disadvantages
and (b) that recipient groups were responsible for solv-
ing present predicaments “on their own.” Along similar
lines, Son Hing, Bobocel, and Zanna (2002) found that
when people perceived workplace discrimination, they
became increasingly supportive of affirmative action
programs.
Murrell, Dietz-Uhler, Dovidio, Gaertner, and Drout
(1994)havereporteddifferinglevelsofsupportforaffir-
mative action as a function of both policy framing and
target group. These researchers looked atWhite college
students’ attitudes as a function of (a) whether a policy
waspresentedwith“socialjustification;”(b)whetherthe
target group was Blacks, “the handicapped,” or the el-
derly; and (c) whether the institutional context was a
business, college, or social organization. It was found
here that people were relatively more supportive when
given the “socially justified” frame and relatively more
supportive when the target group was “the handi-
capped” or the elderly (rather than Blacks). Consistent
with this last finding, it is noteworthy that research also
has found that White people who tend to associate affir-
mative action with Black and Hispanic target groups
(rather than other target groups) also tend to have rela-
tively negative affirmative action attitudes (Kravitz et al.,
2000; Sidanius, Singh, Hetts, & Federico, 2000).
The above literature indicates, in short, that people’s
responses to affirmative action fluctuate significantly
across various “prepackaged” conceptualizations of the
issue.Atthesametime,though,therearehintsinthelit-
erature that people can and do use their own frames
wheninterpretinginformationaboutaffirmativeaction,
for example by deploying particular storylines,
catchphrases, and metaphors when thinking about the
issue. Our notion of framing here, it should be noted, is
very similar to what Fraser and Kick (2000), borrowing
fromWetherellandPotter(1992),call“interpretiverep-
ertoires” and to what Nacoste and colleagues (Nacoste,
1994; Nacoste & Hummels, 1994) term “cognitive
schemas.”
In relevant research conducted by Arriola and Cole
(2001), White college students were asked to describe a
specific affirmative action policy. Not only did different
students describe policies that the authors classified as
being based on fundamentally different definitions of
affirmative action (i.e., quota-based policies, equal-
opportunity policies, and others) but an overwhelming
38% of students—despite having opinions about affir-
mative action—were unable to actually describe any sin-
gle policy at all! These results very clearly indicate that
different people operate with different understandings
of what the term “affirmative action,” in a general sense,
might mean.
Furthermore, in research conducted by Golden,
Hinkle, and Crosby (2001), White and minority adults
were asked whether a policy of organizational monitor-
ing or a policy of government-regulated quotas came
closer to their personal understanding of affirmative
action. Not only was there a blatant lack of consensus
among the respondents (i.e., 54.3% indicated monitor-
ing and 45.7% quotas) but the researchers additionally
foundthat—evenafteraccountingfordemographicand
associated attitudinal variables—the respondents who
indicated monitoring were far more likely to support af-
firmative action than were the respondents who indi-
cated quotas. These results provide a glint of evidence
for one of the key ideas explored in this article: the idea
that people tend to adopt those conceptualizations of
affirmative action that best align with, or help to justify,
their existing predilections.
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A large literature within social psychology attests to
the fact that people’s attitudes are dictated not just by
their values, beliefs, and powers of logical reasoning but
also by a more complicated set of conscious and uncon-
scious personal motivations (e.g., self-enhancement)
and social motivations (e.g., group dominance; e.g., see
Duckitt, 2001; Dunning, 1999; Fiske & Taylor, 1991;
Greenwald, 1980; Kunda, 1990). Thus, although people
may often feel that their attitudes and actions are com-
pletelyunrelatedtosuchpsychologicalmotivations,they
may(unwittingly)work tosatisfysuchmotivations by (a)
selectivelyfocusingattentiononsomesituationsorcases
rather than others; (b) construing concepts or situa-
tions in idiosyncratic ways (i.e., using particular types of
frames);(c)showinggreaterrecallforsomecasesorsitu-
ations than for others; and so on. As applied to political
andpolicyattitudes,thisperspectivesimplysuggests—in
the broadest terms—that personal and social motiva-
tions (in addition to cognitive factors) can make mean-
ingful contributions to the way people thinkand behave
politically(e.g.,seeBorowiak&Golec,2004;Jost,Glaser,
Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003; Redlawsk, 2002).
For example, in a recent meta-analysis examining 88
studies from a total of 12 different countries, Jost et al.
(2003) provided compelling evidence that politically
conservative worldviews are, at least in part, shaped by
threelarge clustersofmotivations:(a)epistemic motiva-
tions (e.g., motivations for uncertainty avoidance and
cognitive closure); (b) existential motivations (e.g., mo-
tivations for self-esteem and terror management); and
(c) ideological motivations (e.g., motivations for system
justification and group dominance). In line with these
meta-analytic findings, Borowiak and Golec (2004) re-
cently reported evidence for associations between the
need for cognitive closure and traditional and mod-
ern (as opposed to postmodern) worldviews—again
suggesting that conservatism is affected by (in this case
epistemic) psychological motivations. Importantly,
though, it should be observed that all of these re-
searchers also emphasize that people do often behave
rationally—by attempting to gather trustworthy infor-
mation about political issues, for example—and do of-
ten rely on beliefs, values, and logical reasoning when
forming their views. They are simply calling attention to
the factthatmotivational factors can also play extremely
important roles.
Following from this motivated social-cognitive per-
spective is the idea that psychological motivations will
partiallydeterminenotjustpeople’slevelsofsupportfor
affirmative action but also the ways in which people ac-
tively construe, frame, or think about affirmative action.
That is, those who are motivated to oppose affirmative
action also should be motivated to view the construct in
relatively repellant terms (termsthatjustifyopposition),
whereas those who are motivated to support affirmative
action also should be motivated to view the construct in
relatively favorable terms (terms that justify support).
Onesetofideologicalfactorsthatmayaffecttheman-
nerinwhichpeople frametheissueofaffirmativeaction
is political conservatism. A good deal of empirical evi-
dence suggests that those with conservative political val-
ues object to affirmative action because it is perceived
to violate widely accepted norms of individual effort,
fairness, and equity (e.g., see Sidanius et al., 2000;
Sniderman & Piazza, 1993). Because of these largely
political and normative objections to affirmative action,
thereisgoodreasontoexpectthatthoseholdingconser-
vative political values also will be motivated to construe
and frame affirmative action in terms that most people
will find objectionable. Along the same lines, beliefs in
the Protestant work ethic (e.g., the belief that success
in U.S. society primarily results from individual merit),
which should be associated with conservatism and with
general opposition to affirmative action, also should be
predictiveofaffirmativeactionframingtendencies.Sup-
porters of the general group dominance perspective,
however,wouldarguethatthisisnottheendofthestory;
instead, they would argue that in addition to conserva-
tive beliefs, motives for group dominance will play a
significant role in predicting people’s framing.
The Group Dominance Perspective
The general group dominance perspective can be
saidtoconsistofaclusterofrelativelyrecentlydeveloped
theories of intergroup relations, including group posi-
tions theory (Blumer, 1958; Bobo, 1999), models of
paternalistic oppression (e.g., Jackman, 1994; van den
Berghe, 1967), realistic group conflict theory (Sherif,
1966), and social dominance theory (Sidanius & Pratto,
1999). Despite some important differences between
thesevarioustheories,allofthemarepremisedonthree
important observations. The first observation is that vir-
tually all modern societies are organized hierarchically,
suchthatsomegroupsofpeople arerelativelydominant
(enjoying disproportionate access to material and sym-
bolic resources such as property and prestige), whereas
other groups are relatively subordinate (suffering dis-
proportionate subjugation to material and symbolic
disadvantages). Second, it is observed that political atti-
tudes and behaviors, especially those concerning the
allocation of resources, are largely manifestations of
group competition. Third, it is observed that dominant
groups,andtoalesserextentsubordinategroupsaswell,
endorse legitimizing myths—“attitudes, values, beliefs,
or ideologies that provide moral and intellectual sup-
porttoandjustificationforthegroup-basedhierarchical
social structure and the unequal distribution of value in
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inferiority, in a “just world,” in political conservatism,
and in the Protestant work ethic can all be considered
legitimizing myths because all of these beliefs serve to
justifyand reinforce existing social hierarchies and have
been shown to be related to desires for group dom-
inanceandhierarchicallystructuredsocialrelationships
(see Sidanius, Levin, Federico, & Pratto, 2001; Sidanius
& Pratto, 1999).
Aseries of predictions follow from these observations
with respect to political attitudes in general and affirma-
tive action attitudes in particular. Specifically, propo-
nents of social dominance theory argue that a central
motivator behind people’s affirmative action attitudes is
social dominance orientation (SDO)—a generalized
tendency to support existing hierarchical relationships
among groups (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle,
1994; Sidanius, Liu, Shaw, & Pratto, 1994; Sidanius &
Pratto,1999).Thisisbecause, relative topeople whoare
low in SDO, those who are high in SDO are expected to
favor ideologies that work to maintain and/or heighten
existing hierarchical relations (e.g., political conser-
vatism, ethnic/racial prejudice), and opposition to af-
firmative action is thought to be one such ideology.
Furthermore, although it is recognized that political
conservatism and endorsement of Protestant work ethic
beliefs (e.g., the belief that success in U.S. society is pri-
marily due to individual merit) are part of what drives
affirmative action attitudes, it also is expected—because
these beliefs are thought to function as legitimizing
ideologies—that they will act as mediators through
which SDO exerts effects;thatis, in addition to affecting
affirmative action attitudes directly, SDO is expected to
affect affirmative action attitudes indirectly as well via its
associations with political conservatism and Protestant
work ethic beliefs.
There is a substantial amount of research supportive
ofthesocialdominanceframework.Tobeginwith,ithas
been demonstrated that SDO is significantly correlated
with racism and with attitudes toward race-targeted poli-
cies such as affirmative action. It also has been shown
that political conservatism is associated with SDO, rac-
ism, and attitudes toward race-targeted policies (e.g.,
Pratto et al., 1994). In addition, Federico and Sidanius
(2002) found that the tendency to endorse principled
objections to affirmative action policies was driven not
merely by race-neutral values but also by dominance-
related concerns such as racism. Moreover, these re-
searchers found, as anticipated, that endorsement of
these objections mediated the effects of group domi-
nance. Furthermore, working quite independently of
social dominance researchers, Fraser and Kick (2000)
have suggested that group dominance motives are likely
to play a critical role in how people frame affirmative ac-
tion. In their research, using discourse analysis, it was
found that participants who were most opposed to affir-
mativeactionandmostlikelytodefineitasblatantlyand
unqualifiedlyunfairwerealsothosewhoweremostlikely
to endorse a stratification ethos—believing, essentially,
thatgroupswithlowsocialstatusdeservedtobeprecisely
where they were. In the present research, we expand on
this past work by empirically examining the role that
SDO plays in driving people’s tendencies to use partic-
ular types of affirmative action frames.
The Current Research
Thepresentresearchseekstoadvanceexistingknowl-
edge of how people construe affirmative action and to
explore why they might construe it in different ways. In
this research, we will examine public opinion among
adult Whites, Blacks, and Latinos about six different
frames as well as information about how often respon-
dents tend to think about affirmative action in each of
these six ways.
Theframesusedinthisresearchweregeneratedfrom
informal focus groups and are representative of the dif-
ferent kinds of frames that emerge in discourse analyses
(e.g., Fraser & Kick, 2000). They are: providing training
to underrepresented groups, engaging in outreach to
recruit members of certain groups, considering group
membership as “one factor among many,” using group
membership as a “tie-breaking” device, using quotas,
and giving preferences to (relatively) underqualified
applicants.
Foursubstantivequestionswillbeaddressedinthisar-
ticle.First,we will examine whetherthere are significant
differences between ethnic groups in their pattern of
support versus opposition to different affirmative action
frames. Previous research using White samples has
shownthatoppositionisrelativelyweakwhenaffirmative
actionisframedintermsoftrainingoroutreachandrel-
ativelystrongwhenitisframedintermsofquotasorpre-
ferring underqualified applicants (e.g., Bell et al., 2000;
Bobo & Kluegel, 1993; Bobo & Smith, 1994; Fine, 1992;
Kinder & Sanders, 1990; Kravitz, 1995; Schuman et al.,
1997; Sniderman & Carmines, 1997; Summers, 1995).
Becausethereisnoreasontosupposethatthissamegen-
eral pattern of support versus opposition will differ for
Whites versus Latinos or Blacks, we expect that all three
groups will show the same pattern—in effect, agreeing
on which frames make affirmative action “look good”
and which frames don’t.
Second, although all ethnic groups are expected to
show the same general pattern of support versus opposi-
tion across the different frames, it is expected, in line
withthegeneralgroupdominancemodel,thattherewill
be a main effect for race/ethnicity, regardless of which
frameisused.Thisistosaythatbecauseallformsofaffir-
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gaps between ethnic and racial groups, members of the
dominant ethnic group (i.e., Whites) should always be
more opposed to affirmative action than members of
subordinate ethnic groups (i.e., Blacks and Latinos),
regardless of how this social policy is framed.
Third, again following from the general group domi-
nance perspective and, more broadly, the motivated
social-cognitive perspective, it is expected that Whites
also will be relatively more likely than minorities to use
negative frames (i.e., those that are seen as most objec-
tionable by respondents in general) rather thanpositive
frames (i.e., those that are seen as least objectionable by
respondents in general). In other words, we expect that
Whites will be relatively more likely than minorities to
think about affirmative action in terms of quotas and
preferences for underqualified applicants (anticipated
to be the most opposed frames) and relatively less likely
tothinkaboutaffirmativeactionintermsoftrainingand
outreach (anticipated to be the least opposed frames).
Similarly, we anticipate that Whites will be relatively
more likely than minorities to think about affirmative
action in ways that they personally judge to be unflatter-
ing rather than flattering.
Finally, again following from the motivated social-
cognitive and group dominance perspectives, we expect
that—above and beyond the effects of race/ethnicity—
bothconservativeideologies(politicalconservatismand
Protestant work ethic beliefs) and SDO will influence
this tendency for people to frame affirmative action in
ways they find personally objectionable.
METHOD
Respondents
Data for this research come from the 1996 Los An-
geles County Social Survey (LACSS), conducted every
year by the Institute for Social Science Research (ISSR)
attheUniversityofCalifornia,LosAngeles(UCLA).The
LACSS is a large omnibus survey of the residents of Los
Angeles County assessing approximately 200 variables,
includingsuchthingsasstandarddemographics,feeling
thermometers concerning various social groups, gen-
eral attitudes regarding race/ethnicity, political ideol-
ogy, and support for policies targeted toward various so-
cial groups. The 1996 sample consisted of 706 adults
randomly selected from Los Angeles County during the
springof1996.Thissamplewascomposedof206Whites,
209 Blacks, 43 Asians, 205 Latinos, and 43 individuals
whoseracial/ethniccategorizationwasOtherormissing
(note that Latino and Black populations were over-
sampled). For the present analyses, only U.S. citizens
identifying as White, Black, or Latino were used, leaving
an effective sample size of 328 (151 Whites, 129 Blacks,
and 48 Latinos).
Sampling Procedure
The survey was conducted by the Computer Assisted
TelephoneInterviewingunitoftheISSRusingarandom
digit dial telephone technique. Interviews were con-
ductedbyregularISSRinterviewingstaffandbystudents
fromanundergraduate surveyresearch methodscourse
who had received 12 hours of interviewing training. To
maximize sample representativeness, the survey made
use of a 12-attempt callback procedure and systemati-
cally varied callback day and time. The survey had a
lower-bound response rate estimate of 45% and an up-
per-bound estimate of 55%. Within each racial/ethnic
group the distribution of sample characteristics on key
social background factors (e.g., native-born status, edu-
cation, sex, age, household income, occupation) closely
resembled that obtained by the 1990 Census for Los An-
geles County (see Bobo, Johnson, Oliver, Sidanius, &
Zubrinsky, 1992, for details). In addition, a systematic
analysisofpotentialnonresponsebias,basedonthepro-
cedure developed by O’Neil (1979), indicated that no
significant nonresponse bias was present (Greenwell,
Strohm, & Bobo, 1994).
Variables
Demographics. Demographic variables included (a)
age, (b) gender (men = 1, women = 2), (c) education
(measured on a 6-point scale from 1 = did not graduate
fromhighschoolto6=earnedagraduatedegree),and(d)esti-
mated household income.
Political conservatism. Political conservatism was as-
sessedwithacompositemeasurebasedonsevenindices.
The indices consisted of (a) a 5-point scale indexing po-
litical party preference (1 = strong Democrat to 5 = strong
Republican), (b) a 5-point political self-description scale
(1 = very liberal to 5 = very conservative), (c) a 4-point scale
assessing agreement with the statement, “The govern-
mentshouldguaranteethatbasichealthcareisavailable
for all Americans” (1 = strongly agree to 4 = strongly dis-
agree), (d) a 4-point scale assessing agreement with the
statement, “The government should lower taxes” (1 =
stronglydisagree to 4 = stronglyagree),(e)a 4-point scale as-
sessingagreementwiththestatement,“Thegovernment
has taken over too many things that should be handled
by individuals, families, and private businesses” (1 =
strongly disagree to 4 = strongly agree), (f) a 4-point scale as-
sessingagreementwiththestatement,“Thegovernment
should be actively involved in solving problems that de-
velop between groups, businesses, and individuals” (1 =
strongly agree to 7 = strongly disagree), and (g) a 4-point
scale assessing agreement with the statement, “The gov-
ernment should reduce its assistance to the poor” (1 =
660 PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN
 at HARVARD UNIV SOCIAL RELATIONS LIB on July 23, 2009  http://psp.sagepub.com Downloaded from stronglydisagree to 4 = stronglyagree). The final measure of
conservatism consisted of the sum of the standardized
scores for the seven questions (Cronbach’s α = .66).
Success and individual effort. This construct was mea-
sured with respondents’ responses regarding the state-
ment, “Success, or one’s achievement in American soci-
ety, depends primarily on individual merit.” Responses
tothisitemweremeasuredona4-pointscale(1=strongly
disagree to 4 = strongly agree).
Social dominance orientation (SDO). SDO was assessed
using the complete 16-item Social Dominance Orienta-
tion Scale (Cronbach’s α = .80; see Sidanius & Pratto,
1999).Allitemswereassessedona4-pointresponsescale
(rangingfrom1=stronglyagreeto4=stronglydisagree).Re-
spondents’ final SDO scores were determined by re-
verse-coding the necessary items and then taking the
scalemean(seeSidanius&Pratto,1999).Highvalueson
thisscalearereflectiveofahighsocialdominanceorien-
tation, whereas low values are reflective of a low social
dominance orientation.
Tendencies to use specific affirmative action frames. The
manner in which people themselves tended to frame af-
firmative action was assessed by first reading the follow-
ing introductory paragraph to each respondent:
People have different ideas about what affirmative ac-
tion is. I am going to give you a number of ideas people
have about it. For each one I would like you to tell me if
thisiswhatYOUthinkofwhenIsay“affirmativeaction.”
Respondents were then given the six frames: (a) “Quo-
tas, that is, setting aside places for certain groups”; (b)
“Using group membership as one of several consider-
ations”; (c) “Using membership in certain groups as a
tie-breaker when applicants are equally qualified”; (d)
“Giving training to certain groups so they can compete
equally”; (e) “Making a special effort to find qualified
peoplefromcertaingroups”;and(f)“Givingpreference
tomembersofcertaingroupswhoarelessqualifiedthan
someone else.” After each frame was read, respondents
were asked to indicate the degree to which they person-
ally tended to think about affirmative action that way us-
ing a 3-point scale (1 = not at all,2=often,3=very often).
The order in which the six definitions were read was
randomized across respondents.
Opposition to specific affirmative action frames. Respon-
dents were then asked to indicate the degree to which
they supported or opposed affirmative action as defined
byeachofthesixframes.Anintroductiontothisseriesof
questions read as follows:
Now, something a little different. I’d like you to tell me
how you personally feel about different kinds of affirma-
tive action. For each of the following policies, please tell
me if you strongly support, somewhat support, some-
what oppose, or strongly oppose the policy.
After each definition was read for the second time, re-
spondents indicated their degree of opposition using a
4-pointscale(1=stronglysupportthepolicyto4=stronglyop-
pose the policy). Once again, the order in which the poli-
cies were presented was random.
RESULTS
Opposition to Specific Frames
The first substantive question concerned whether af-
firmative action attitudes depended on framing and/or
respondents’ race/ethnicity. To explore this question,
we performed a two-way analysis of variance with re-
peated measures over one factor. Race/ethnicity served
as the between-subjects factor and type of affirmative
action frame served as the within-subjects factor.
The results of this analysis showed that opposition to
affirmative action was significantly affected by frame;
Frame: F(5, 1565) = 155.52, p < .001, η = .58. As can be
seen in Figure 1, people were most opposed to affirma-
tiveactionwhenitwasdefinedintermsofquotas(“Quo-
tas, that is, setting aside places for certain groups”)
and—especially—when it was defined in terms of hiring
relatively less-qualified people (“Giving preference to
members of certain groups who are less qualified than
someoneelse”).Incontrast,peopleweremostinfavorof
affirmative action when it was defined in terms of train-
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Figure 1 Mean opposition to each of six different affirmative action
frames, by respondent race/ethnicity.
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pete equally”) and outreach (“Making a special effort to
find qualified people from certain groups”). Intermedi-
ate attitudes occurred when affirmative action was de-
fined in terms of tie-breaking or in terms of considering
group membership as “one factor among many.”
Although there was a small interaction between re-
spondents’ race/ethnicity and frame in predicting atti-
tudes; Frame × Race/Ethnicity: F(10, 1565) = 2.85, p <
.01, η = .13, the data also showed, as expected, that all
three racial/ethnic groups exhibited the same general
pattern of opinions across frames (i.e., the groups con-
verged on a common notion of which frames were rela-
tively worthy of support and which were relatively objec-
tionable). To quantify this pattern of convergence, we
correlated the mean ratings (for the various frames)
across the three groups. This analysis revealed a very
highdegreeofpatternsimilarityacrossthethreegroups;
Whites-Latinos: r = .972, p < .01; Whites-Blacks: r = .961,
p < .01; Blacks-Latinos: r = .914, p < .01.
Inaddition,thedatainFigure1seemtoimplythatthe
six affirmative action frames can be roughly classified
into three categories, each consisting of two frames: (a)
relatively negative frames (i.e., the use of quotas, prefer-
encesforless-qualifiedcandidates),(b)intermediate,or
neutral, frames (i.e., the use group membership as “one
factor among many,” the use of group membership as a
“tie-breaker”), and (c) relatively positive frames (i.e.,
training certain groups so they can compete equally,
making a special effort to find qualified people from
certain groups).
Despite the fact that there was very strong agreement
across race/ethnicity concerning which forms of affir-
mative action are more or less objectionable, there was
also, consistent with our second hypothesis, a clear and
relatively strong main effect for race/ethnicity; Race/
Ethnicity: F(2, 313) = 19, p < .001, η = .33. Although post
hoccomparisons(usingtheScheffémethod)showedno
overall difference between Blacks and Latinos, Whites
were significantly more opposed to affirmative action in
general than either of these minority groups at the p <
.05 level and beyond.
1
Furthermore, consistent with social dominance the-
ory,contrastanalysesrevealedthatWhitesweremoreop-
posed to affirmative action than were minorities within
each and every frame. As can be seen in Figure 1, even
when affirmative action was framed in the terms that
peoplefindmostacceptable(i.e.,“Givingtrainingtocer-
tain groups so they can compete equally”), Whites were
still more opposed than minorities.
To further probe this White-minority difference, we
again conducted analyses of variance but restricted
analyses to the form of affirmative action that most peo-
ple found the most objectionable (i.e., “Giving prefer-
ence to members of certain groups who are less quali-
fied”) and the form thatmost people found the most ac-
ceptable (i.e., “Giving training to certain groups so they
cancompeteequally”).WealsocombinedBlacksandLa-
tinos into a single, subordinate group. The question
then became whether the degree of dominant/subordi-
nate difference in opposition to affirmative action de-
creasesasonemovesfromthemostobjectionable frame
to the most acceptable frame. If this were indeed the
case, we should expect a significant interaction between
race/ethnicity and frame. However, the results of this
analysis showed no such interaction; Framing × Race/
Ethnicity: F(1, 324) < 1. In other words, framing affirma-
tive action in generally benign rather than noxious
terms did essentially nothing to attenuate the domi-
nant/subordinate group difference in opposition to af-
firmative action; this difference remained more or less
constant regardless of framing.
Tendencies to Use Specific Frames
Thenextmajorquestionaddressedwaswhetherdom-
inant and subordinate racial/ethnic groups have a ten-
dency to frame the construct of affirmative action in
specific different ways. Given the overall thesis of moti-
vatedsocialcognition,andgiventhegenerallogicofthe
groupdominanceparadigm,wewouldexpectthatmem-
bers of dominant groups (i.e., Whites) would tend to
frame affirmative action in the terms that most people
find objectionable (i.e., in terms of quotas and prefer-
ences for less-qualified candidates), whereas members
of subordinates groups (i.e., Latinos and Blacks) would
tend to frame affirmative action in terms that most peo-
ple find acceptable (i.e., in terms of training and out-
reach). To examine this question, we performed an-
other two-way analysis of variance with repeated
measures over one factor. Race/ethnicity served as the
between-subjects factor and type of frame served as the
within-subjects factor.
The results ofthisanalysisshowed aslightmain effect
for frame,withparticipantstending toframe affirmative
actioninwaysthat—accordingtomostpeople—arerela-
tively positive (i.e., as training and outreach); Frame:
F(5, 1570) = 5.72, p < .001, η = .13. As can be seen in Fig-
ure 2, the results of this analysis revealed no significant
main effect for race/ethnicity, F(2, 308) < 1. Rather,
there was a significant interaction between type of affir-
mative action frame and race/ethnicity; Frame × Race/
Ethnicity:F(10,1570) = 6.64,p < .01,η = .20.
2 To simplify
the interpretation of Figure 2, note that we have ar-
ranged the various frames in terms of their general de-
gree of perceived acceptability, from affirmative action
as training (the most acceptable frame) to affirmative
action as preferring less-qualified candidates (the most
unacceptable, or objectionable, frame). As can be seen
662 PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN
 at HARVARD UNIV SOCIAL RELATIONS LIB on July 23, 2009  http://psp.sagepub.com Downloaded from inthefigure,bothsubordinategroupshadatendencyto
thinkofaffirmativeactionintheleastobjectionableways
(i.e., as training and outreach) rather than in the most
objectionable ways (i.e., rather than as quotas or prefer-
ences for less-qualified applicants). Whites, in contrast,
showed a slight tendency to do the reverse—more often
framing affirmative action in negative terms rather than
positive terms. Furthermore, repeated measures analy-
ses of variance for each racial/ethnic group revealed
that these differences were statistically significant within
each racial/ethnic group; that is, Whites: F(5, 720) =
4.98,p< .01,η = .18;Latinos:F(5,220) = 2.28,p< .05,η =
.22; Blacks: F(5, 630) = 12.97, p < .01, η = .30.
A slightly different perspective on the framing ques-
tion was explored by regressing each type of affirmative
action frame on a cluster of demographic factors (here,
using the simple dominant/subordinate, or White/-
minority, distinction) as well as a cluster of political
ideologies/social values, namely, political conservatism,
belief thatsuccessisafunctionofone’sindividualmerit,
and social dominance orientation (see Table 1). Consis-
tent with the picture one gets from Figure 2, net of all
other factors, there was a general (but not always signifi-
cant)tendency for Whites to eschew positive frames and
embrace negative ones. With respect to the two neutral
forms of affirmative action (i.e., tie-breaking and “one
factor among many”), there were essentially no race/
ethnicity effects.
However, it is also noteworthy that there were rela-
tively weak relationships between the demographic and
sociopolitical variables and tendencies to use particular
affirmative action frames. Although there was no dra-
matic difference in the amount of variance accounted
for across the different frames, the data seem to suggest
that tendencies to use the most negative affirmative ac-
tion frames (i.e., quotas and preferences for less-quali-
fied candidates) are slightly better accounted for than
are tendencies to use the other four frames. In particu-
lar, the tendency to frame affirmative action in the most
negative way (i.e., preferences for less-qualified candi-
dates)wasbetteraccountedforthananyother(adjusted
R
2 = .12, p < .001) and also more powerfully accounted
forbytheideological/value dimensionsofSDO(β=.15,
p < .05) and political conservatism (β = .14, p < .05).
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Figure 2 Mean tendency to use each of six different affirmative ac-
tion frames, by respondent race/ethnicity.
TABLE 1: Opposition to Six Different Affirmative Action Frames Regressed on Demographic Factors and Sociopolitical Values/Ideologies
Affirmative Action Framing
Positive Frames Neutral Frames Negative Frames
Preferences for
Training Outreach Tie-Breaking “One Factor Among Many” Quotas Less-Qualified Applicants
Demographic factors
Income .06 .04 .09 .05 .16** .03
Age .10† .05 .05 .07 .01 .02
Education –.05 .12* .09 .03 .04 –.04
Female –.06 .02 –.01 –.02 –.06 –.05
White –.18*** –.10 –.03 –.04 .12* .20***
Values/ideologies
SDO –.09 –.04 .15* .02 .04 .15*
Conservatism –.06 –.12* –.00 –.02 .11† .14*
Success and individual effort –.02 –.02 .02 .01 .06 .08
Adjusted R
2 .04** .03* .02† .00 .07*** .12***
NOTE: Entries are standardized beta coefficients. SDO = social dominance orientation.
†p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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one frame at a time, we examined people’s overall ten-
dencies to use negative rather than positive frames. To
do this, we constructed a variable that reflects the rela-
tionshipbetween(a)thedegreetowhichagivenindivid-
ual opposed a particular frame and (b) the degree to
which that same individual tended to use that frame
when thinking about affirmative action. This variable
was constructed by determining the correlation (r)b e -
tween (a) and (b) above for each individual.
In other words, suppose that the values for a given
person’sopposition toeachofsixaffirmativeopposition
frames were X1,X 2,X 3,X 4,X 5, and X6, and suppose that
same person, when asked how often he or she tended to
thinkofaffirmativeactionineachoftheseways,gavethe
responses Y1,Y 2,Y 3,Y 4,Y 5, and Y6. We then simply com-
puted the product-moment correlation between the Xs
andtheYsforeachindividualparticipant.Whenthiscor-
relation is positive, it indicates that a person chooses to
frameaffirmativeactioninwaysthatheorshefindsespe-
cially disturbing or offensive. When this correlation is
negative, on the other hand, it indicates that a person
tends to choose frames that he or she finds most appeal-
ing, or flattering. Because positive values here reflect
tendencies to use the frames that are viewed most nega-
tively,we refer to thiscorrelation coefficient asthe nega-
tive framing index (NFI).
3
It should be understood that the NFI, although
strongly related to general (positive or negative) atti-
tudes toward affirmative action, is a distinct construct.
Indeed, this distinctiveness is evidenced by the fact that
the product-moment correlation between one’s general
opposition to affirmative action (not defined in any par-
ticularway)andtheNFIwasahealthy.51,indicatingthat
approximately 74% of the variance of the NFI can still
not be accounted for by general opposition to affirma-
tive action.
Inspection of descriptive statistics for the NFI index
revealed an overall arithmetic average of –.128 (SD =
.503). Thus, in general, people had a mild tendency to
frame affirmative action in terms that they found rela-
tively positive. Nonetheless, there is strong reason to ex-
pectthatthisframingbehaviorwilldependonrace/eth-
nicity,amongotherthings.Asafirstpassatthisquestion,
weperformedone-samplettestswithineachofthethree
racial/ethnicgroupsagainstthenullhypothesisthatthe
population framing index was 0.00 (i.e., against the hy-
pothesis that there was neither a tendency to use posi-
tively viewed frames nor a tendency to use negatively
viewedframes).Theresultsoftheseanalysesshowedthat
both Blacks and Latinos had a tendency to use frames
that they personally believed to be relatively favor-
able(forthetwo-tailedtests,Blacks:M=–.286,SD=.442,
t = –7.35, df = 128, p = .001; Latinos: M = –.120, SD = .479,
t =–1.74,df=47,p=.09).Incontrast,andsomewhatsur-
prisingly, the NFI for Whites was not significantly dif-
ferent from zero, indicating that, on average and as a
group,Whitesshowednooveralltendencytoframeaffir-
mative action in either terms that they felt were positive
ortermsthattheyfeltwerenegative(M=.005,SD=.524,
t < 1, df = 151, ns).
The Determinants of Negative
Affirmative Action Framing:
A Causal Analysis
Having examined racial/ethnic differences in per-
ceptions of different affirmative action frames, and
racial/ethnic differences in tendencies to use particular
types of frames, our analysis next moved beyond ques-
tions of race/ethnicity to examine some of the socio-
political/ideological underpinnings of framing ten-
dencies. As will be recalled, within the motivated social
cognition perspective (e.g., Jost et al., 2003), we should
expect an NFI difference not just with respect to race/
ethnicity but also with respect to conservative beliefs
(e.g.,political conservatism and the belief thatsuccess is
primarily due to individual merit).
Social dominance theoryalsowould leadustoexpect
anNFIdifferencewithrespecttoSDO.Morespecifically,
itsuggeststhatinadditiontoindirectlyaffectingtheNFI
via conservative beliefs, SDO should have significant di-
rect effects of its own. In this analysis, we therefore com-
pare the usefulness of the conservatism and social domi-
nance models in predicting the tendency to frame
affirmative action in ways that one personally sees as
negative rather than positive.
In doing so, we employed structural equation model-
ing (using LISREL 8.54) with the variance-covariance
matrix as input and maximum likelihood estimation of
allparameters.Wewillfirstexploreherewhatwecallthe
conservatism model, where the tendency to frame affir-
mative action in negative terms (i.e., the NFI) is pre-
dictedbypolitical conservatism,thebelief thatsuccessis
duetoindividualmerit,andrace/ethnicity.Thisconser-
vatismmodelwillthenbecomparedwiththesocialdom-
inance model, which adds SDO as a direct and indirect
predictor. In both of these analyses, we will take account
of basic demographic variables and operationalize re-
spondent race/ethnicity with a simple dichotomous dis-
tinction (Whites = 1, minorities = 0).
The standardized path coefficients for the conser-
vatism model are shown in Figure 3. Consistent with the
assumptions of this model, race/ethnicity, belief that
one’ssuccessisafunctionofindividualmerit,andpoliti-
cal conservatism were all found to make significant net
contributions to the tendency to frame affirmative ac-
tioninnegativeterms(γ=.19,p<.05,β=.12,p<.05,and
β=.25,p<.05,respectively).Furthermore,inspectionof
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significant direct contributions to the NFI as well as sig-
nificant indirect contributions via the tendency for
Whites to be more politically conservative (γ = .27, p <
.05)andthetendency for Whitestobe more likely tobe-
lieve that one’s success is largely a function of individual
merit(γ=.18,p<.05;indirecteffect=.07,p<.01).
4None-
theless,despitethesetheoreticallyconsistentresults,the
conservatism model did not provide a satisfactory fit to
the data overall (i.e., χ
2 = 57.96, df = 12, p < .000, root
mean square error of approximation [RMSEA] = .104,
Comparative Fit Index [CFI] = .83).
We therefore estimated the social dominance model,
in which SDO was allowed to have both direct and indi-
rect effects on the NFI (via its associations with both po-
litical conservatism and belief in individual merit; see
Figure4).Becausethesocialdominancemodelisnested
within the conservatism model, we were first able to de-
terminewhetherthesocialdominancemodelprovidesa
significant increase in model fit. With the loss of only 3
degrees of freedom we were able to improve the model
fit by some 47.22 chi-square units. This was indeed a sta-
tistically significant increase in model fit (p <1 0
–5). Not
only did this social dominance model significantly im-
provemodelfitbuttheoverallleveloffitofthemodelto
the data was quite strong (χ
2 = 10.74, df =9 ,p < .29,
RMSEA = .024, CFI = .99). In addition, inspection of the
pathcoefficients in Figure 4 showed, as anticipated, that
SDO made a statistically significant net contribution to
the tendency to frame affirmative action in negative
terms(β=.18,p<.05).Furthermore,alsoconsistentwith
the general reasoning of social dominance theory, SDO
made statistically significant indirect contributions to
the NFI via the mediated effects of both political conser-
vatism and belief in individual merit (indirect effect =
.07, p < .01). Finally, it should be noted that the indirect
effects of race/ethnicity on the NFI were every bit as
strong as in the conservatism model (indirect effect =
.08, p < .01).
DISCUSSION
This research has sought to deepen existing knowl-
edgeabouthowpeopleperceiveaffirmativeactionwhen
it is framed in different ways, how people typically frame
affirmative action when thinking about it on their own,
andwhatfactorsare predictive ofpeople’stendencies to
use particular (positive vs. negative) frames. This re-
search also has sought to examine whether and how re-
spondent race/ethnicity might interact with frame per-
ceptionsandwithtendenciestouseparticularframes.In
this research, we employed a survey methodology to
obtain responses from a large sample of White, Latino,
and Black adults. The frames we studied included those
most commonly represented in the public discourse:
providing training to certain groups, engaging in out-
reachtorecruitmembers ofcertaingroups,considering
group membership as “one factor among many,” using
group membership as a “tie-breaking” device, using
quotas,andgivingpreferencesto(relatively)underqual-
ified applicants.
Our results indicated, in line with previous research
(e.g., Bell et al., 2000; Bobo & Kluegel, 1993; Bobo &
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Figure 3 Structuralequationmodelofthepredictorsofparticipants’
“negative framing index”: Conservatism model.
NOTE: SDO = social dominance orientation, χ
2 = 57.96, df = 12, p =
.000, root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) = 0.104,
Comparative Fit Index (CFI) = .83.
*p < .05.
Figure 4 Structuralequationmodelofthepredictorsofparticipants’
“negative framing index”: Social dominance model.
NOTE: SDO = social dominance orientation, χ
2 = 10.74, df =9 ,p = .29,
rootmeansquareerrorofapproximation(RMSEA)=0.024,Compara-
tive Fit Index (CFI) = .99.
*p < .05.
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Kravitz, 1995; Schuman et al., 1997; Sniderman &
Carmines, 1997; Summers, 1995), that opposition to
affirmative action is an extraordinarily pliable attitude,
significantly dependant on framing. As expected, re-
spondents of all races/ethnicities showed rather strong
opposition to the same frames (seeing quotas and pref-
erences for relatively underqualified applicants as rela-
tively objectionable) and rather weak opposition to the
same frames (seeing training and outreach initiatives as
relatively acceptable). However, also as anticipated,
Whiteswereconsistentlymoreopposedtoaffirmativeac-
tion than were the other groups, regardless of framing.
Indeed, our analysis revealed that even framing affirma-
tive action in the most acceptable terms did essentially
nothing to attenuate racial/ethnic differences in
affirmative action opposition.
Racial/ethnic divergences were further apparent
when tendencies to use particular frames were exam-
ined.OurresultsindicatedthatcomparedtoWhites,La-
tinos and Blacks tend to think of affirmative action in
flattering rather then unflattering terms. Thus, not only
was there evidence that different people tend to use dif-
ferent frames but there also was evidence that framing
tendencies varied across respondents in a systematic
rather than random way (Golden et al., 2001; Kravitz
et al., 2000; Kravitz & Klineberg, 2000), in this case,
along racial/ethnic lines. Sniderman, Crosby, and
Howell (2000) recently argued that
given the genuine variety of proposals falling under the
overalltentofgovernmentactionsdealingwithrace,citi-
zens may, and likely will, take different positions as to
whatgovernmentshoulddoregardingrace,justsofaras
they are being asked to approve different courses of
action. (p. 238)
We concur, although these results also compel us to add
that people are not always passive (or objective) recipi-
ents of policy information but are instead often active in
constructing and deploying particular definitions of so-
cialpolicy,definitionsthatcanservetoreinforceparticu-
lar views and to bias perceptions of new information.
Using the motivated social-cognitive perspective as
a guiding framework, we also examined some of the
sociopolitical/ideological motivations underpinning
people’s tendencies to use negative rather than positive
frames. Based on structural equation modeling, we
found that the theoretical model derived from social
dominance theory was superior to the simpler conserva-
tism model. In the conservatism model, in addition to
demographic variables, just two variables (which were
themselves expected to be related) were predicted to af-
fect the negative framing index: political conservatism
and support for the idea that success in U.S. society is a
function of individual merit. Despite the fact that the
predicted paths were indeed found, this model pro-
vided, overall, a rather poor fit to the data.
Thesocialdominancemodelwasidenticaltothisfirst
model exceptthatitalsoexpected adirecteffectofSDO
on negative framing, direct effects of SDO on conserva-
tive beliefs (political conservatism and support for the
notion that success is a function of individual merit),
and—finally—indirect effects of SDO on negative fram-
ingviaitsassociationwiththeseconservativebeliefs.This
social dominance model provided an excellent fit to the
data,indicatingthathighlevelsofSDOpowerfullyinflu-
ence people’s tendencies to think of and use the most
damningframesofaffirmativeactiontheycan.Thisfind-
ingisconsistentwithresearchshowingtheutilityofdom-
inance motives—above and beyond other ideological
and attitudinal variables—in predicting simple opposi-
tion to affirmative action (e.g., Federico & Sidanius,
2002), and it adds to that research by indicating that the
social dominance perspective can significantly account
for how people actively construct (evaluative) frames of
affirmative action that can be used to reinforce and per-
petuate preexisting attitudes.
The notion that people form schemas, or frames, for
issuessuchasaffirmativeactionisnotnew(e.g.,Nacoste,
1994; Nacoste & Hummels, 1994). In fact, there have
been important hints in the literature about precisely
what kinds of assumptions people’s affirmative action
frames tend to include. For example, research con-
ductedbyHeilman,Battle,Keller,andLee(1998),using
a mixed-sex sample of undergraduate and MBA stu-
dents, found that—unless they were told otherwise—
students’ behaviors suggested that they assumed that
female-targeted affirmative action programs stipulated
that an applicant’s merit be a peripheral consideration
(rather than a central one). Other research (Arriola &
Cole, 2001; Golden et al., 2001) has indicated that many
peopleautomaticallyassumethataffirmativeactionpoli-
ciesinvolve“quotas”or“preferentialtreatment.”Ourre-
search adds to this stream of literature by empirically
demonstrating that people’s tendencies to frame affir-
mative action in particular ways are probably motivated
(by SDO) rather than being arbitrary or stochastic; that
is,ourresearchindicatesthatthetendencytouseframes
that are viewed as objectionable rather than acceptable
is,in part,driven by people’sdesires to maintainand/or
fortify existing group-based hierarchy.
Our research also has practical implications. It sug-
gests, similar to past research (e.g., Kinder & Sanders,
1990),thatpolicymakers,employers,andotherswhode-
sire to change people’s (positive or negative) attitudes
toward affirmativeactionshould employ andencourage
the use of certain frames as opposed to others. In addi-
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tween affirmative action attitudes and dominance mo-
tivesneedstobekeptinmindandthatpolicymakersand
employers will not be able to eliminate group differ-
ences in affirmative action attitudes so facilely. Indeed,
regardless of how affirmative action information is pre-
sented to people, it appears that people absorb such in-
formation only through the filter of (group-dominance-
related) preexisting assumptions.
Some researchers have suggested that an unearthing
andclarificationofpeople’sdifferentassumptionscould
help to build consensus among affirmative action sup-
porters and detractors. For example, Golden et al.
(2001) have suggested,
Honest and open dealing [with the issue of affirmative
action] must surely begin with a clear exposition of the
terms of the debate. When clear definitions are agreed
upon, the distance between the supporters and the
opponents of affirmative action may decrease. (p. 83)
Our results cast doubt on this idea, however, given that
significant racial/ethnic differences in support for affir-
mative action persisted across each and every frame we
examined, and given that the frames guiding people’s
thinkingaboutaffirmativeactionaresointimatelyyoked
to broader ideological and attitudinal variables. In sum,
despite the fact that people evaluate affirmative action
very differently depending on how it is framed, it seems
clear that they seize and deploy those frames that best
complement their level, dominance-related motives.
NOTES
1. These basic conclusionsheld even after family income,age, edu-
cation, and gender served as covariates.
2. Controlling for income, age, education, and gender eliminated
themaineffectofaffirmativeactiontypebutleftallothereffectsessen-
tially the same.
3. Specifically, imagine the following data matrix. The negative
framingindex(NFI)issimplythecorrelationbetweenvectorsXandY.
Tendency to
Think of
Disapproval Affirmative
of a Action in
Particular Terms of a
Affirmative Particular
Type of Affirmative Action Action Frame Frame
Training X1 Y1
Outreach X2 Y2
Tie-breaking X3 Y3
“One factor among many” X4 Y4
Quotas X5 Y5
Preferences for less-qualified
applicants X6 Y6
4. These mediational tests in LISREL are essentially equivalent to
the common Sobel procedure used in connection with least-squares
regression (e.g., see Kaplan, 2000, pp. 35-36).
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